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tilateral trade rounds (which culminated in the demise of the 
Doha Round in 2005) and growing frustration with what some 
consider the unfair practices of their trading partners (most 
notably China)1. As a result, the world has witnessed a pro-
liferation of bilateral and regional trade deals through which 
countries aim to further their trade interests more directly.
More recently, multilateralism and the idea of international 
trade as a win-win situation received another severe blow 
when the current US administration shifted to an “America 
First” stance with a bilateral, zero-sum perspective on and 
approach to extracting beneﬁ ts from trade.2 It may serve as 
an illustration that in the course of trying to address its con-
cerns and push its interests with selected trading partners, 
the US declared its long-standing ally, the EU, a foe. It sus-
pended the negotiated EU-US Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Partnership (TTIP), did not sign the Trans-Paciﬁ c 
Partnership Agreement (TPP – subsequently signed by the 
remaining TPP11 partners under the designation of the Com-
prehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Paciﬁ c 
Partnership, CPTPP), and  renegotiated an existing plurilat-
eral trade agreement with only one partner at a time – the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In addition, 
the US has threatened trade partners with and embarked on 
imposing import trade tariffs. Those unilateral measures have 
met with retaliation, among others by China and the EU, who 
have imposed import duties on a range of US products in re-
sponse to US tariffs on EU steel and aluminium. It also raised 
the possibility of tit-for-tat trade wars – with the EU, but cur-
rently most acutely with China.
Citing discontentment with the way the WTO oversteps its 
competences – a concern that the EU shares to a certain ex-
tent – the US has taken actions e.g. blocking the nomination 
of judges to arbitration panels, that jeopardise the WTO’s dis-
pute settlement mechanism, which is central to the multilat-
eral rules-based trade order. The WTO has warned that this, 
together with the US entering into trade conﬂ icts with the rest 
of the world, risks damaging the WTO as a guarantor of the 
© The Author(s) 2018. Open Access: This article is distributed under the 
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unre-
stricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if chang-
es were made.
1 While the WTO would have been well placed to extract concessions 
from China at the time it was to join, China has since become a major 
global trading force.
2 This became very clear at the June 2018 G7 meeting in Montreal, Can-
ada. Even the possibility of the US withdrawing from the WTO is no 
longer unthinkable.
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The world trading system faces contestation at an unprece-
dented level. The United States, once a fundamental pillar for 
free trade and multilateral trade order, has changed course 
and joined the countries who have voiced a chorus of con-
cerns about globalisation. The various actors’ motivations 
for contestation may differ greatly (social and environmental 
effects on the one side, bilateral trade disequilibria on the 
other), but what they all have in common is the perception of 
unfairness and negative side effects. It follows that the pro-
gression of globalisation can no longer be taken for granted 
and that globalisation, and world trade as part of it, may be 
downscaled or unwound in the future.
The European Union, which has been a staunch supporter 
of multilateralism in international trade, ﬁ nds itself in a setting 
in which trade disputes risk spiralling into trade wars and the 
international rules-based trade order is cast in to doubt. The 
role of the EU, which is a major player in the world trade arena 
given its market size and openness to trade, has become piv-
otal. However, it cannot simply defend the current system.
Rather, the EU faces a twin challenge: it seeks to uphold a 
rules-based international order, while perhaps less obviously 
but we would argue crucially, shaping the future world trade 
order. The latter requires that the EU project its values (en-
shrined in the European model that aims at making growth 
compatible with social and environmental protection) onto 
the global stage through its trade policy. The challenge is es-
pecially acute with respect to the still largely ignored link be-
tween trade and the environment.
Risk of trade wars
Global trade and growth have undoubtedly beneﬁ ted greatly 
from the multilateral framework drawn up under the auspices 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). It has en-
countered sizable problems that await resolution, however, 
as indicated by the increasingly difﬁ cult conclusion of mul-
DOI: 10.1007/s10272-018-0759-y
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At the same time, the EU has, rather successfully, sought 
to augment and strengthen its trade ties and to strategically 
close ranks with like-minded trading partners.5 The shared 
concern – the new US stance did not only raise the EU’s re-
solve to sustain free trade but also the importance of secur-
ing free trade for many other countries – has predictably pro-
moted and accelerated new EU trade deals with existing and 
prospective trading partners.6
In light of the already rather low tariff barriers among WTO 
members, the EU embarked upon a new generation of in-
ternational agreements. It means that in most cases, and in 
the absence of any one-size-ﬁ ts-all trade agreement, the EU 
negotiates comprehensive free trade agreements with third 
countries.7 Recent examples of those deep free trade agree-
ments include the EU-Canada Comprehensive and Econom-
ic Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU-Japanese Free Trade 
Agreement (JEFTA), and potentially also one with the United 
Kingdom, once it becomes a third party to the EU.8
US protectionism boosted EU trade dynamism. Furthermore, 
it opened up a strategic space in which the Union could al-
so seek to bring global trade in line with its preferences for 
growth with high environmental and social standards. The 
crucial question is to what extent is the EU willing to put this 
capacity to good use.
The meeting between Commission President Juncker and US 
President Trump on 25 July 2018 in Washington, an EU initia-
tive, resulted in an agreement to suspend a war on trade tar-
iffs and work toward an accord.9 It also provides clues about 
the EU’s priorities in trade and about the kind of compromises 
the EU looks prepared to make in the name of external trade.
5 For an explanation of this new policy stance, see A. B o n g a rd t , F. 
To r re s : Comprehensive Trade Agreements: Conditioning Globali-
sation or Eroding the European Model?, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 52, 
No. 3, 2017, pp. 165-170.
6 For instance, CPTPP countries turned to the EU to make (or acceler-
ate or deepen) free trade and investment deals. There has also been a 
fresh impetus for a number of free trade negotiations that were previ-
ously slow-moving or had stalled (among others with Japan, South 
Korea, and Mercosul) to upgrading existing ones (such as with Mexi-
co).
7 An update of the state of play of EU free trade agreements is available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotia-
tions-and-agreements/.
8 A discussion of EU international trade and Brexit can be found in A. 
B o n g a rd t , F. To r re s : Trade Agreements and Regional Integra-
tion: the EU after Brexit, in: R. L o o n e y  (ed.): Routledge Handbook 
of International Trade Agreements, London and New York 2018, Rout-
ledge, pp. 296-306.
9 See European Commission: Joint U.S.-EU Statement following 
President Juncker’s visit to the White House, Statement/18/4687, 25 
July 2018, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATE-
MENT-18-4687_en.htm.
international system and imperils world trade.3 While the task 
of reforming an international organisation of 164 members, 
which have different interests but take decisions by unanimity, 
is a steep and cumbersome one that is only possible by build-
ing the necessary cross-country consensus, it is in the EU’s 
interest to ensure a workable trade order. In our view, however, 
the EU’s approach to global trade should not stop there.
Credibility and compromise
First and foremost, the EU is seeking to uphold free trade, 
de-escalate trade conﬂ icts and defuse looming trade wars. In 
doing so, it is treading a ﬁ ne line in its trade policy. For a global 
player like the EU, it must adequately respond to US unilat-
eral actions and not give in to threats in order to preserve its 
credibility. However, it is not in its interest to let trade conﬂ icts 
escalate and be drawn into trade wars. Those are costly in 
real terms, as the European Central Bank (ECB) warns, due to 
the serious risk they pose to activity in the short to medium- 
term and to the outlook for global trade.4 The EU opted to en-
gage with the US and to ﬁ nd some common ground; there 
are obviously some shared interests and concerns, such as 
WTO reform and market access discrimination and intellec-
tual property right protection in China. Bilateral trade remains 
important, regardless of the fact that TTIP, a comprehensive 
trade agreement aimed at creating a common transatlantic 
marketplace with low barriers to trade and investment, ulti-
mately was the only EU agreement that did not advance. TTIP 
is currently on hold by decision of the current US administra-
tion. The EU-US trade deal was hotly contested in the EU and 
proved unsellable in light of the reach of third country regula-
tory autonomy on EU territory.
The EU has pursued two parallel courses of action. To start 
with, it attempts to negotiate a settlement with the US on the 
WTO. The EU regards the WTO, in particular its role in global 
trade disputes, as vital for upholding a rules-based interna-
tional trading order. Since no clarity exists as to whether the 
US administration intends to reform the WTO or do away with 
it, the EU drew up reform proposals that take up the kind of 
complaints that the US has raised, to be presented to the 
WTO this month (September 2018). This move allows the EU to 
test the US’ willingness to work constructively on its critiques 
(and consequently lift its opposition to the judges on dispute 
settlement panels) or otherwise call its bluff with regard to its 
stated commitment to engage with the EU on WTO reform.
3 Declarations by Roberto Azevedo, Director-General of the WTO: War-
um wir die Welthandelsorganisation WTO brauchen, Handelsblatt, 9 
August 2018.
4 European Central Bank, Economic Bulletin No. 5, 9 August 2018, 
available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/html/
eb201805.en.html.
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ing those concerns in trade and to protecting the EU’s high 
standards. The EU-US agreement could jeopardise this how-
ever. The EU abandoned its customary defence of the Paris 
Climate Agreement and of environmental standards for the 
sake of achieving a suspension of US trade sanctions. And 
although any concessions may appear symbolic since higher 
imports of US soybeans and LNG rest on market decisions, 
those are two areas that happen to be rather sensitive on en-
vironmental grounds (genetically modiﬁ ed agricultural prod-
ucts and gas produced through fracking). The objective to 
internalise environmental externalities on efﬁ ciency and envi-
ronmental grounds and to work toward the European model 
through external trade appears to have been sidelined in the 
name of trade.
Pragmatism that privileges trade over European values does 
not bode well for the defence of the European model in trade. 
In the face of vocal criticism of the negative side effects of 
international trade, combined with the rise of populism,14 the 
EU needs to shape globalisation in order to make it work for 
its citizens and deliver results that are in line with European 
values and objectives. Even though some progress has been 
made, the European Commission needs to fully internalise 
those values in its trade policy as well and actively push for 
them or face backlash.
External trade and EU regulation
Any discussion on what should be the EU’s approach to glob-
al trade needs to take into account that external trade and 
regulation interact and impact on the European model. The 
EU’s new generation of deep trade agreements magniﬁ es the 
issue of regulation, which is already complex in internal EU 
trade in an international trade context.15
The economic case for EU comprehensive trade agreements 
rests on realising largely untapped beneﬁ ts from abolishing 
non-tariff barriers to trade. Trade and welfare effects are com-
plex and may even be ambiguous. Although conditioned by 
the scope of the agreements in question, e.g., covering areas 
like public or regulated services, intellectual property rights 
and investment protection, they tend to have broader implica-
tions for society and inﬂ uence its model of development.
14 The success of anti-EU populist parties in continental Europe, es-
pecially in France, derives partly from opposition to a (Anglo-Saxon-
type) deregulated economic model and a neglect of the European 
model. It stresses the importance of fairness for the success of the 
European economy and of the European project. The social chapter 
is an expression of the EU seeking to complete its model in the social 
sphere. See A. B o n g a rd t , F. To r re s : The road towards a genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union: more competitive and fairer, in: F. A l -
l e m a n d , P. C h i o c c h e t t i  (eds.): Competitiveness and Solidarity in 
the European Union: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Abingdon, Rout-
ledge, forthcoming. 
15 A. B o n g a rd t , F. To r re s : Comprehensive Trade Agreements, op. cit.
A truce with the US, but at what price?
The EU managed to achieve a (temporary) truce (i.e. no ad-
ditional US import tariffs on cars from the EU) as long as a 
perspective EU-US trade agreement is negotiated without 
making substantial concessions to the US. The US will reas-
sess (rather than lift) its punitive tariffs. The EU will commit 
to raising imports from the US in certain sectors (more soy-
beans to make up for reductions of US exports to China in 
the face of Chinese retaliations toward US policy, and more 
American liqueﬁ ed natural gas (LNG), thereby competing with 
Russian gas and diversifying EU energy supplies). The parties 
also commit to negotiating a comprehensive tariff reduction 
for industrial goods and a reform of the WTO.
For the time being the truce holds but it is fragile. The scope 
of the agreement has turned out to be ambiguous and partly 
contentious within the EU (Is agriculture in or out? Is the idea 
to reactivate the wide TTIP or go with a reduced version of 
it?).10 And to cement the truce, the EU has already made fur-
ther offers (higher quotas for non-hormone US beef exports, 
a lift on all auto tariffs if the US reciprocates). These are con-
sidered insufﬁ cient by the US.11
If we accept the argument that what matters is that the agree-
ment ended the escalation of tit-for-tat tariffs and averted a 
trade war,12 then the question at what price, if any, becomes 
relevant. After all, any potential beneﬁ ts of reviving TTIP de-
pend heavily on doing away with regulatory barriers.13 How-
ever, TTIP was heavily contested because of the concern that 
any such deal might come at the expense of EU (present or 
future) standards (notably high sanitary, food and environ-
mental standards).
The EU Commission has often been accused in the past of 
privileging trade liberalisation over societal (labour, envi-
ronmental) concerns. It has hence committed to internalis-
10 The Juncker deal risks disrupting European unity. Favoured by Ger-
many (with an automotive industry strongly exposed to US sanctions), 
France rejects a wide TTIP-style agreement and the inclusion of ag-
riculture. It is also opposed to the EU negotiating while sanctions are 
active. In any case, renewed trade would require a negotiation man-
date for the Commission and the European Parliament would also 
have a word to say (limiting the role of expert groups).
11 Perhaps more importantly in practice, the US is already experienc-
ing that in today’s globalised world (with features like complex supply 
chains), trade policy can be a twin-edged sword, so that tariffs hurt 
not only foreign but also domestic economic agents through more 
expensive inputs, and that trade partners retaliate against punitive 
tariffs, and prefers to focus more on China for the time being.
12 D. G ro s : Europe’s Trade Coup, Project Syndicate, 6 August 2018.
13 W. C o n n e l l , W. S i m o n s , H. Va n d e n b u s s c h e : The cost of 
non-TTIP: A Global Value Chain Approach, CEPR Discussion Paper 
No. 12705, February 2018, argue that the costs of non-TTIP are even 
larger if one takes into account complex global value chains. Yet, they 
also conclude that while those potential beneﬁ ts are substantial, they 
derive less from the abolition of tariff barriers than from non-tariff 
measures.
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Public contestation of the EU’s new generation of compre-
hensive trade agreements sits uneasily with EU trade dy-
namics. TTIP and CETA, in particular, crystallised popular 
opinion regarding the negative effects of globalisation on Eu-
ropean society and the environment. The backlash against 
the effects of globalisation were then directed at the Union, 
which was perceived as prioritising economic (commercial) 
interests over societal concerns.
It is worth noting that through the bilateral rules estab-
lished in the context of a comprehensive trade agreement, 
the EU not only inﬂ uences global norms and standards but 
that those in turn feed back into the EU’s economic order in 
a way that traditional trade agreements have not. They can 
therefore either reinforce the European model or weaken it. 
The matter is economically and politically sensitive at a time 
when the European model, as a result of the limited progress 
of the EU’s economic and institutional modernisation agenda 
– and on the belated implementation of the social pillar – is 
still not consolidated.
Sustainable rules and value-based trade order
At this junction for world trade, the approach that the EU 
takes to global trade will deﬁ ne its credibility as a global ac-
tor and impact the sustainability of the European integration 
project. The issue is whether the Union will actively work to-
wards a rules-based international order, which delivers on 
EU preferences for quality growth and fairness and which 
prioritises the overdue link between environmental sustain-
ability and trade. Economic growth cannot be sustained over 
time if the limits of the planet are not accounted for; nor is 
trade sustainable if negative externalities are not factored in. 
The EU’s self-declared leadership role in combating climate 
change provides a test case for its resolve.
Bilateral trade agreements offer the EU an easier and speed-
ier way to advance European goals and project its values 
onto the global stage than multilateral forums. On the down-
side, they could also lower environmental and labour stand-
ards and give multinational ﬁ rms the power to challenge na-
tional laws and limit the EU’s and member states’ regulatory 
space. A trade focus may easily lead the EU to overlook the 
complex and potentially broad consequences for society 
of economic and trade agreements. The recent experience 
indicates that the EU only belatedly integrated the environ-
ment and the Paris Climate Agreement in the South Korea 
free trade agreement and in JEFTA,19 respectively, and that 
19 Adherence to the Paris Climate Agreement was also only belatedly 
introduced upon French insistence, and without much detail. As B. 
U n m ü s s i g , M. K e l l n e r : A Climate-Friendly Response to Trump’s 
Protectionism, Project Syndicate, 4 June 2018, observe, the EU could 
also enhance its climate leadership credentials by adopting border 
carbon adjustment rules, which are in line with WTO rules.
This is because the inclusion of non-tariff barriers to trade 
– and of other issues such as investment protection – inter-
feres with political preferences on the role of the state in the 
economy and highlights the role of regulation.16 This is also 
intrinsically political as it is based on values and beliefs. Ac-
ceptance is not a given and ratiﬁ cation is more complex and 
uncertain once they encroach on member state competenc-
es.17 The market making versus market correcting issue that 
features prominently in the internal market context is an even 
larger topic in deep free trade agreements.
What made regulation-based integration possible in the EU, 
economically and politically speaking, was sufﬁ cient simi-
larity of preferences or, in its absence, the societal accept-
ability of mutual recognition of national market rules. Mutual 
recognition is the fall back solution in light of European varie-
ties of capitalism. It implies competition between regulatory 
systems that presupposes a degree of trust in other countries 
to ensure the rules will be similar in their effect and supervi-
sion as well as enforcement capacity to function. Regulatory 
arbitrage has proven problematic at times even in a European 
context as the EU has become more heterogeneous over 
time. To the extent that comprehensive agreements come to 
constrain market correction, they can reinforce negative inte-
gration tendencies in the EU by putting downward pressure 
on standards through trade. To hope otherwise would require 
a notion of similarity with regard to third countries that is al-
ready stretched within the Union.
The CETA case illustrated that rules on regulation in compre-
hensive trade agreements, such as through regulatory coop-
eration, mutual recognition or investment court arbitration, 
may come to limit the European and national policy space. 
Those were also key elements in the contestation of TTIP.18
16 Most EU-level rules currently refer to risk regulation, which pursues 
safety, health, environmental and consumer protection objectives. 
This risk regulation concerns mostly goods and services markets – for 
example ﬁ nancial market regulation and supervision, and network in-
dustry aspects – and only sporadically labour and capital markets. On 
a more horizontal level, it includes environmental regulation and con-
sumer protection and rights. The precautionary principle, enshrined 
in the treaties, is an important EU principle in this context. The re-
jection of the original Services Directive, based on the home country 
principle, well illustrated the political difﬁ culties even within the (with 
increasing membership ever more heterogeneous) EU club.
17 The Court of Justice of the European Union clariﬁ ed the distribution of 
competences between member states and the EU in its verdict on the 
Singapore agreement. A comprehensive trade agreement qualiﬁ es as 
a mixed agreement (like CETA) and hinges not only on ratiﬁ cation at 
the EU level but also at the EU member state, and in some cases, 
regional level. CETA has been applied provisionally since the sec-
ond half of 2017 but is still awaiting ratiﬁ cation by all member states. 
JEFTA, the EU’s largest comprehensive trade agreement so far, was 
signed in July 2018. It could enter into force as of the beginning of 
2019 if things went to plan.
18 The EU had been prepared to go further under TTIP with the US than 
the US had been under TPP, with deeper agreement on regulatory is-
sues, covering three broad areas, namely market access, regulatory 
issues and non-tariff barriers, and rules.
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portunity to be an anchor of an international rules and val-
ue-based system. That would mean to push notably for 
high labour, environmental and climate standards in trade 
agreements, something that the European Commission 
has embraced in theory but seemingly not yet in practice. 
it abandoned the climate issue to achieve a trade truce with 
the US.
Yet, with the US’ commitment to the international trading 
order increasingly cast in doubt, the EU has a unique op-
